Assault of the Paramours: Satanic Attack on the Institutions: Thomas Jipping on the 1st Amendment; Robert Bork on the SCOTUS; A. A. Terruwe on Psychopaths

NOTE: The transcriptions from Thomas Jipping and A. A. Terruwe will be posted as soon as they are completed.

Jipping, Thomas L. *Does the First Amendment Violate Itself?* (Washington: Free Congress Research & Education Foundation, 1997), 19-24; 29-30; 32-33:

See NOTE

Bork, Robert H. (ed.). *"A Country I Do Not Recognize": The Legal Assault on American Values.* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2005), xv-xvii:

Of the two religion clauses [of the First Amendment]—the one forbidding an establishment of religion and the other guaranteeing its free exercise—it is the establishment clause that has suffered the most abuse. Both the text and the history of its adoption show conclusively that what was to be placed beyond Congress's power was the establishment of churches on the then-familiar European model. The anti-establishment clause manifested no hostility to organized religion as such nor any intention to forbid Congress for aiding religion generally. No amount of historical demonstration of what was intended has been capable, however, of deflecting a majority of the justices from antagonism to religion. Striking down a Pennsylvania law requiring that the school day begin with a reading from the Bible … the Court said that this "breach of [constitutional] neutrality that is today a trickling stream may all too soon become a raging torrent." [See *Abington School District v. Schempp*, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963): http://www.tourolaw.edu/patch/Abington/] (p. xv]

Have the justices no knowledge of history? For a century and a half the Republic staggered along without the Court's protection from the perils of religion, and the trickling stream never achieved even the status of a sluggish creek. Vibrant religion there was, but no hint of theocracy or religious war. Now, under the tutelage of the Court and the American Civil Liberties Union, religious symbols and speech must everywhere be suppressed. [pp. xv-xvi]

If any other kind of symbolism or speech, say, advocacy of Maoism, were expunged by government as thoroughly as are manifestations of religion, cries of censorship would resound throughout the land, and the Supreme Court would without doubt find the ban unconstitutional. The effect of the Court's consistent denigration of religion in the name of the Constitution must be to so marginalize religion in our public life as to weaken the influence of religion throughout society. [p. xvi]

Today's Court manifests one of the less attractive hangovers from the Sixties, that it is, in fact, enacting, in the name of the Constitution, the modern liberal agenda of political correctness. That, I believe, is indisputable, shown not only by the decisions of the Court but by a comparison of the rhetoric of the Court majority and that of the founding document of the Sixties New Left, the 1962 *Port Huron Statement*, a document that became the most widely circulated manifesto of the New Left. The *Statement* asserted that "The goal of man and society should be … finding a meaning in life that is personally authentic," and this was to be accomplished through a (largely undefined) "politics of meaning." [pp. xvi-xvii]

Perhaps the first explicit statement of this attitude came in Justice Harry A. Blackmun's dissent, joined by three other justices, in *Bowers v. Hardwick*, arguing that there is a constitutional right to engage in homosexual sodomy. Rejecting the view that prior cases involving the right to privacy had confined that right to the protection of the family, Blackmun wrote:

> We protect those rights [associated with the family] not because they contribute, in some direct and material way, to the general public welfare, but because they form so central a part of an individual's life. "The concept of privacy embodies the moral fact that a person belongs to himself and not to others nor to society as a whole. [See *Bowers v. Hardwick*, 478 U.S. 186, 204 (1986): Blackmun's dissent at: http://supct.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC_CR_0478_0186_ZD.html. Also see Genesis 2:22-24, 1 Corinthians 7:1-4; Psalm, 100:3]

Moral facts there may be, but that assuredly is not one of them. Blackmun was saying that the family has no value except as it contributes to the individual's gratification. Presumably, when there is a gratification deficit, individuals are morally free to shed themselves of spouse, children, and parents. On this reasoning, no-fault divorce should be a constitutional right. The second sentence sweeps even more broadly. There would seem to be no moral obligation to obey any inconvenient law and, moreover, no duty owed to colleagues, neighbors, nation, society, or anyone or anything outside one's own skin. The ultimate in psychopathology is urged on us as a constitutional right. [p. xvii]

Terruwe, A. A. A. "Characteristics of the Psychopathic Personality," in *Psychopathic Personality and Neurosis*, trans. and ed. Conrad W. Baars and Jordan Aumann (New York: P. J. Kenedy & Sons, 1958), 28-36:

See NOTE

Bork, *"A Country I Do Not Recognize,"* xvii-xix:

The four member minority did not, of course, seriously mean anything so incomprehensible, but it speaks volumes about their mood that they could utter such a sentiment, as well as about the frivolity with which they justified their position to the nation. What they did mean was that the justices would choose which obligations a person must honor and that among the least of these are laws reinforcing morality. [pp. xvii-xviii]

Blackmun's position became constitutional law when *Bowers* was overruled in *Lawrence v. Texas*. In creating a right to homosexual sodomy, Justice (Anthony) Kennedy's opinion for a six-member majority, repeating language from a special concurrence earlier, stated:

> These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. [See *Lawrence v. Texas*, 156 L. Ed. 2d 508 (2003) at: http://supct.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/02-102.ZO.html, and *Planned Parenthood v. Casey*, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992): Justice Sandra O'Connor's Opinion at: http://supct.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/91-744.ZO.html.]

That is not an argument but a Sixties oration. It has no discernible intellectual content; it does not even tell us why the right to define one's own concept of "meaning" includes a right to abortion or homosexual sodomy but not a right to incest, prostitution, embezzlement, or anything else a person might regard as central to his dignity and autonomy. Nor are we informed of how we are to know what other rights will one day emerge from some person's concept of the universe. [p.xviii]

The chaotic mood of *Lawrence* seems equivalent to that which animated the student radicals who composed the *Port Huron Statement*. A transcendental politics … cannot be satisfied by the messiness of compromises of democratic politics; nor can it be satisfied by the list of particular freedoms embodied in the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment. Transcendence requires an overarching principle, which is what the "mystery passage" tried, unsuccessfully, to articulate. [pp. xviii-xix]

> That failure was inevitable. The Court, too, finds it impossible to articulate a theoretical limit to what other branches of government may do in curbing immorality. In attempting to establish a general, comprehensive statement of limits, the "mystery passage" … necessarily goes well beyond the particularized limits on governmental power set out in the actual Constitution. That is also why the Court becomes increasingly authoritarian. In the absence of a real theory, political correctness will have to do. The Court, like the New Left, may practice a politics of expression and self-absorption, but … it does serious, lasing, and perhaps permanent damage to valuable institutions, socially stabilizing attitudes, and essential standards. [p. xix]

30. The assault on the institutions is being conducted by emissaries that have the power to reinterpret our Constitution by perceiving rights that are not stated but by inventing them cause irreparable harm on the divine institutions so that the definition of marriage must ultimately be altered to agree will the "politics of meaning" that guides the justices of the Supreme Court.

31. So vague an understanding of the divine institutions did not serve to confuse the Shulammite but it had so influenced Solomon.

32. Consequently we find the Shulammite clearly understood that Solomon was not her right man. Solomon in his frantic search for happiness now assumes that damsel number one thousand one is his right one.

33. In order to seal the deal, Solomon now turns up the heat in Act III. A brief review of the corrected translation of the first two acts and the introduction to Act III is probably a good idea since we have spent six weeks on "The Assault of the Paramours: A Warning to Doctrinal Damsels."[1]

[1] To order the series ***Assault of the Paramours: A Warning to Doctrinal Damsels*** write **Joe Griffin Media Ministries, PO Box 6432, Chesterfield, MO 63006 USA**, and request lessons **CC02-574 through CC02-597**. Indicate choice of format: **audiotape** or **MP3**.

